Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. It can be deceived and it is all too often incomplete. Fluoride. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. What really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964? Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." How the Gulf of Tonkin Incident Embroiled the US in the Vietnam Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. 9. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. . The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. LBJ's War is a new, limited-edition podcast that unearths previously unheard audio that helps us better understand the course of the Vietnam War and how Lyndon Johnson found himself where he did. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. 5. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. For the maritime part of the covert operation, Nasty-class fast patrol boats were purchased quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United States was not involved in the operations. 12. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. National Security Agency Congress supported the resolution with Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. Here's why he couldn't walk away. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. Suns and Stars To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. Oklahoma City Bombing. Operation Fast and Furious 10 Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. Those early mistakes led U.S. destroyers to open fire on spurious radar contacts, misinterpret their own propeller noises as incoming torpedoes, and ultimately report an attack that never occurred. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The Navys seaborne SIGINT effort in support of OPLAN-34, called Desoto Missions, played a key role in the events that ultimately led to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. Gulf of Tonkin incident | Definition, Date, Summary, Significance Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube . 17. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. 1. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. This volume deals only with the former. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. Gulf of Tonkin Conspiracy Theory . Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. McNamara was ready to respond. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States The Taliban silenced him. Codenamed Desoto, they were special U.S. Navy patrols designed to eavesdrop on enemy shore-based communicationsspecifically China, North Korea, and now North Vietnam. Media Manipulation. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. In the days leading up to the first incident of August 2nd, those secret operations had intensified.. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. (2021, February 16). A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. 9/11. The 122 additional relevant SIGINT products confirmed that the Phu Bai station had misinterpreted or mistranslated many of the early August 3 SIGINT intercepts. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution | History, Facts, & Significance On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration . CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. Under cover of darkness, four boats (PTF-2, PTF-3, PTF-5, and PTF-6) left Da Nang, racing north up the coast toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ), then angling farther out to sea as they left the safety of South Vietnamese waters.2 About five hours later they neared their objective: the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN? Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. In turn, that means The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. 313-314. 136-137. Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. 15. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. ", "No," replied McCone. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. Conspiracy That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. ThoughtCo. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. The United States denied involvement. The stage was set. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. We still seek no wider war.. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. Office of the Historian Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States.
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